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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Supreme Court has Jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §
78-2-2(3)0) (1998).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Is the appropriate Standard of Review for addressing whether the Board of Oil,
Gas & Mining (Board) has the legal authority to define by rule the terms uSand,"
"Graver5 and "Rock Aggregate" (The Rule) for interpreting and carrying out the
purposes of Utah Code Ann. § 40-8-1 (1987) (the Mining Act) the intermediate
abuse of discretion standard set forth in Morton Int'l v. State Tax Comm'n. 754
P.2d 41 (Utah 1988) and Williams v. P.S.C.. 720 P.2d 773 (Utah 1986)?

2.

Did the Rule adopted by the Board exceed the Board's statutory grant of authority
to enact rules reasonably necessary to carry out the purposes of Title 40 Chapter 8
of the Utah Code (the Mining Act)?

3.

Is the Rule supported by substantial evidence when viewed in the light of the
whole Administrative Record under Utah Code Ann. § 63-46a-12.1 (1989)
Administrative Rulemaking Act (UARA)?

4.

Is the reviewing court limited to determining whether the administrative agency
has made a rational decision to adopt the contested rule based solely on the official
rulemaking record of the administrative agency under Utah Code Ann. § 63-46a12.1 (1989) (UARA)?

1

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
STATUTES, ORDINANCES, AND RULES

The statute at issue is the Utah Mined Land Reclamation Act, Utah Code Ann. § 40-8-1
(1987)("the Acr). The administrative rule at issue is Utah Admin. Code R647-1-106 ("the
Rule"). Rulemaking cases are governed by the Utah Administrative Rule Act, Utah Code Ann. §
63-46a-l to 16 (Supp. 1990) (UARA). This case is governed specifically by 63-46a-12.1
Judicial Challenge to Administrative Rules (copy of Statute attached as Addendum A).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This is an action under the Administrative Rulemaking Act, Utah Code Ann. § 6346a-12.1 (Supp. 1990), to challenge the promulgation of rules defining the meaning of
the statutory phrases ;%sand," "gravel" and ;irock aggregate." Over the course of almost a
year and after five public hearings and opportunity for written and verbal comment, the
Board of Oil Gas and Mining (BOGM) filed final rules defining the terms "sand,"
"gravel" and '"rock aggregate."
Course of Proceedings
Plaintiff/Appellant Contractors brought suit in Third District Court for Salt Lake
County by filing a Complaint and alleging that the Contractors were an aggrieved party
by virtue of its members who are alleged to be adversely affected by the rule. Contractors
further alleged that the Board's challenged rule was contrary to the intent and language

of the Mining Act, and that, therefore, the Board exceeded its authority. The Contractors
asked that the rule be struck down and that the case be tried by jury. R. 1 - 8. As
required by Utah Code Ann. § 63-46a-12.1(3)(ii) and (iii), the Defendants filed a
responsive pleading (R. 12-26), and filed the Administrative Record with its Answer. R.
253-477. Contractors filed a discovery request which was resisted by the Board and the
Court entered a Protective Order prohibiting discovery. R. 649-552. Thereafter, both
parties filed Cross Motions for Summary Judgment.
Disposition by the Trial Court
The District Court set the Cross Motions for Summary Judgment for oral argument
and ruled in favor of the Board of Oil, Gas and Mining. R. 644-69. The Court found that
the parties were in agreement that there were no issues of material fact which would
preclude the granting of a Motion for Summary Judgment and adopted the standard of
judicial review proposed by the Board, which was the intermediate standard of deference
or "'tolerable limits of reason" test as set forth in Williams v. Public Service Comm'n of
Utah, 754 P.2d 41 (Utah 1987) (Williams II). The Court applied that portion of the
Williams rule providing for review of mixed matters of fact and law or when interpreting
operative provisions of the statutory law for which the rational basis standard provides
that the Court will set aside the rule only if it is arbitrarily imposed beyond the limits of
reason. The Court found that the Plaintiff had failed to demonstrate that there was
anything arbitrary or capricious about the rule. The Court found that the Administrative
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Record when viewed as a whole supported the Board's rule by substantial evidence, and
that proper rulemaking procedures were followed. Further, the Court found that even if it
were to adopt the correction of error standard suggested by the Plaintiff, with no
deference to the agency it would have reached the same result. R. 643-649. The Court
entered judgment on April 17,2000. R. 652. Plaintiff Contractors filed their Notice of
Appeal on May 3,2000.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On or about October 14, 1998, the Board filed with the Clerk of the Third District
Court a true and correct copy of the two-volume Administrative Record (the " Admin.
R/') of that certain rulemaking proceeding before the Board which is now challenged by
Contractors in this matter. R. 253-477.
LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND
Title 40, Chapter 8 of the Utah Code (the Mining Act), and the agency rules in the
Utah Admin. Code at R647, set forth the requirements of the Utah Minerals Program.
The Utah Minerals program is administered by the Utah Division of Oil, Gas & Mining
(Division) under the supervision of the policy-making Utah Board of Oil, Gas and Mining
(Board).
In 1987, the Utah Legislature passed House Bill 311 ("HB 311") to create an
exemption in the Mining Act for "rock aggregate" deposits and operations. The sponsor
of HB 311, Rep. Jim Christensen, described rock aggregate as, ;%[s]ometimes when you
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deal with sand and gravel, House members, you get some big rocks in there and you
kinda make small ones out of them. This is the aggregate part of it." R. 51-52 (emphasis
added).
THE DEFINITIONS OF "SAND." "GRAVEL" & "ROCK AGGREGATE
ADOPTED BY THE BOARD
By administrative rule, the Board has defined "sand" as follows: "'Sand' means a
naturally occurring unconsolidated to moderately consolidated accumulation of rock and
mineral particles, the dominant size range being between 1/16mm to 2mm, which has
been deposited by sedimentary processes." Utah Admin. Code R647-1-106
"Definitions." See Utah State Bulletin, February 15, 1998 Vol. 98, No.4 (a copy is
reproduced in R. 472-475.
By administrative rule, the Board has defined "gravel" as follows: "'Gravel' means
a naturally occurring unconsolidated to moderately consolidated accumulation of rock
and mineral particles, the dominant size range being between 2mm and 10mm, which has
been deposited by sedimentary processes." Utah Admin. Code R647-1-106
"Definitions." See Utah State Bulletin, February 15, 1998 Vol. 98, No. 4 (a copy is
reproduced in R. 472-475).
By administrative rule, the Board has defined "rock aggregate" as follows: " ; Rock
Aggregate' means those consolidated rock materials associated with a sand deposit, a
gravel deposit, or a sand and gravel deposit, that were created by alluvial sedimentary
processes. The definition of rock aggregate specifically excludes any solid rock in the
5

form of bedrock which is exposed at the surface of the earth or overlain by
unconsolidated material." Utah Admin. Code R64 7-1-106 "Definitions." See Utah
State Bulletin, February 15, 1998 Vol 98, No. 4 (a copy is reproduced in R. 472-475).
CONTRACTORS' PROPOSED "INTRINSIC VALUE"
DEFINITION OF "ROCK AGGREGATE"
In the rulemaking proceedings before the Board, Contractors did not object to the
Board's definition of "sand" and "gravel," R. 127, but the Contractors did object to the
Board's definition of "rock aggregate." The Board declined to act on Contractors'
comment that the Board should, in Contractors' opinion, define "rock aggregate" to mean
a "naturally occurring accumulation of rock or gravel material that is >10mm in size that
may or may not have been deposited by sedimentary processes, which have no greater
intrinsic value than the material in which it is contained." R. 126, 222 (emphasis added).
INFORMAL PUBLIC COMMENT ON THE PROPOSED DEFINITIONS
On April 9, 1997, a letter from the Utah Mining Association to then Division
Deputy Director Lowell P. Braxton (today he is the Director) stated: "[regarding the
sand, gravel and rock aggregate definition, we have reviewed the definition and have no
objection to defining these materials so as to provide a standard by which to determine
which operations are mines and which are sand and gravel." R. 327.
Before adopting the Rule, the Board received informal public comment on the
record about the alleged need, and the alleged lack of need, for the then-draft Rule during
the briefing sessions held at its public hearings in May 1997, June 1997, July 1997,
6

October 1997, and January 1998. (Board Briefing Transcripts, R. 59, 98, 106, 112, 47).
At the May 28, 1997 briefing session, Cindy Kromer, a concerned citizen, states that she
did not think that ''over the long haul, regulation by local municipalities [was] going to
hold up well. The expertise is not there. And the municipalities vary too much in terms
of their size and the resources that they can bring to bear on the issue." R. 95.
INFORMAL PUBLIC INPUT PRIOR TO THE FORMAL RULEMAKING PROCESS
On July 25, 1997, the Division's Associate Director of Mining, Mary Ann Wright,
sent out a letter to inform 173 interested parties that the "informal rulemaking process to
define the terms of ;sand,' 'gravel5 and ;rock aggregate'" was about to begin. R. 277282. On November 13, 1997, a notice for a meeting on November 25, 1997, to "develop
definitions for three commodities: sand, gravel and rock aggregate, which are exempted
from regulation under the Utah Mined land Reclamation Act..." was distributed to more
than sixty cities, communities and private citizens. R. 249. On November 25, 1997, at
the Sand, Gravel, and Rock Aggregate Definition meeting, the Division met with several
interested parties, including concerned citizens, members of the Contractors, the Utah
Geologic Survey, School Trust Lands, Staker Paving, the Emery County Road
Department and the Division. R. 235-237.
On November 28, 1997, interested parties were notified of a second meeting on
December 15, 1997 to discuss the proposed definitions and other alternatives. R. 238.
On December 15, 1997, the Division met with interested parties. "At the conclusion of
7

the December 15, 1997 meeting, an additional opportunity was afforded to meeting
attendees and others to send written comments to the Division. This comment period
closed on January 5, 1998. Comments were received and revisions were proposed for the
three definitions under consideration." R. 125. During the January 28, 1998 meeting,
representatives of the Contractors favored a definition of rock aggregate that takes into
account the "intrinsic value as well as consolidated and unconsolidated material/' R. 135.
Cindy Kromer, a concerned citizen, favored the Division's original proposed definition.
R. 138.
After the informal stage of gathering input from the public about whether a rule
was even needed, the Board announced its intent to move forward with formal
rulemaking on *cthe definition of sand, gravel and rock aggregate, with the understanding
that, in listening to all of the discussions today and in previous hearings-that the
definition of sand and gravel as proposed by the Division is that definition which will
move forward in the rulemaking process, and that the definition of rock aggregate move
forward as the definition adopted by the Board in the Larson Limestone case, which the
Board's counsel will provide the Division." R. 141-142.
THE FORMAL RULEMAKING PROCESS
On February 3, 1998, ~[p]er the direction of the Board at the January 28, 1998
briefing session, the Division had proceeded with formal rulemaking for [Defining Sand,
GraveL and Rock Aggregate R647-1-106]. The proposed definitions for sand and gravel
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are taken from the informally proposed Division version and the rock aggregate definition
is extracted from the Board Order in the Larson Limestone matter/' R. 36.
The Division published Notices of Hearing for Docket No. 98-001 in The Tribune
and the Deseret News on Sunday, February 8, 1998. The Notice of Hearing invited
public comment on the proposed rule amendment Utah Admin. R. 647-1-106, Minerals
Regulatory Program Definitions, until Wednesday, March 18, 1998. R. 38. At its
February 25, 1998 public hearing, the Board held a formal hearing on the record to
receive evidence about the form of the proposed Rule as had been duly published in the
Utah State Bulletin on February 15, 1998. R. 470-471. See also 2/25/1998 Board
Hearing Transcript R. Vol. I at 354-411.
Before adopting the Rule, the Board received into evidence Exhibits A-Z and 1-3
filed by the Division in connection with the February 1998 hearing. R. 453. Exhibits AZ and 1-3 contained the following information:
A.

Diagrammatic Cross-Section of Sand and Gravel Deposit Illustrating
Proposed Rule Definitions. R. 49.

B.

Utah Map Showing Location of Sand & Gravel Sites. R. 150.

C.

Board Order on Larson Limestone Hearing dated 8/19/94 and Larson
Limestone Supreme Court Decision dated 9/25/95 - R. 151-178.

D.

Transcript of the Board Briefing Session held on 1/28/98.

E.

Memo from L. Braxton to Board of Oil, Gas & Mining re: Formal
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Rulemaking dated 2/3/98 - Contains copies of the rule amendments and the
completed Division of Administrative Rules form. R. 205-211.
Memo from L. Braxton to Board dated 1/12/98 - Contains a table which
discusses the pros and cons of several of the proposed definitions. R. 212215.
Division Comments - Rock Aggregate Definition dated 12/19/97 - Contains
discussion between Division employees about the proposed definitions. R.
216-221.
J B Parsons Co. Comments dated 12/15/97. Contractors present their
favored definitions and reasons for their support. R. 222-223.
Division Handout re: Sand, Gravel & Rock Aggregate - Division material
which summarizes the Board's findings and the Utah Supreme Court's
findings in Larson Limestone. R. 224-232.
Agenda for 12/15/97 Rulemaking meeting - Division analyzes proposed
definitions for rock aggregate. R. 239-243.
Notice of 12/15/97 Public Meeting to Discuss proposed Rule. R. 238.
Notes of 11/25/97 Public Meeting - Contains summary of public comments
on the proposed definitions, at 233-237.
Contractors' Proposed Definition for Rock Aggregate dated 11/25/97. R.
244.
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N.

Agenda for 11/25/97 Rulemaking Meeting. R. 245-248.

0.

Memo from Bryce Tripp to Mary Ann Wright dated 11/19/97 - contains a
critique of proposed definitions of *wgravel," "sand/"1 and "rock aggregate.v
R. 259-260.

P.

Notice of 11/25/97 Public Meeting to Discuss Proposed Rule. R. 249-252.

Q.

Transcript of the Board Hearing-Briefing Session held on 10/22/97 - The
Board grants Contractors' request to postpone the proposed rulemaking for
a period of ninety days. R. 261-271.

R.

Proposed Definitions for Sand, Gravel & Rock Aggregate dated 6/26/97. R.
272-276.

S.

Letter from Mary Ann Wright Initiating Informal Rulemaking Process
dated 7/25/97 - contains a list of interested parties who were informed of
informal rulemaking and a copy of a survey card concerning the issue. R.
277.

T.

Letter from R. Thorn, Contractors, to Board dated 7/3/97 - contains a list of
government agencies that already regulate the sand and gravel industry. R.
284-287.

U.

Letter from J. Carter to Contractors dated 7/2/97 - Copy of letter requesting
information about agencies who currently regulate the sand and gravel
industry. R. 287.
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V.

Memo from J. Carter to Informal Rules Review Group dated 6/26/97. R.
289-325.

X.

Letter from J. Carter to Contractors dated 5/7/97. R. 326.

Y.

Letter from Contractors to Board dated 5/1/97 - Written comments from
Contractors to bring their concerns before the Board.

Z.

Letter from T. Bingham, Utah Mining Association, to L. Braxton dated
4/9/97 - Utah Mining Association approves the definition proposed by the
Division. R. at 327.

AA.

Proposed Definitions for Sand, Gravel & Rock Aggregate dated 4/8/97. R.
331-332.

BB.

Memo from L. Braxton to Board dated 2/7/97 - contains the proposed rule
for sand, gravel and rock aggregate. R. 333.

CC.

Memo from L. Braxton to Board dated 2/7/97 - contains the proposed rule
for sand, gravel and rock aggregate. R. 334-351.

At the February 25, 1998 hearing, Division Director Lowell P. Braxton, who is a
geologist, testified that "[the Division does not] regulate sand, gravel and rock aggregate
and [the Division does not] propose to regulate that. But in the ten years that have
followed statutory exclusion of rock aggregate from [the Division's] regulatory purview,
it's apparent that [the Division] need[s] definitions so that the Division understands
clearly where its regulatory purview ends and so that [the Division's] customers also
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understand where the regulatory purview ends. " R. 360. Mr. Braxton also stated that the
Division supported a definition based on geological distinctions (as opposed to the
Contractors proposed intrinsic value or commodity-specific tests) for the following
reasons: "We have a statutory obligation to regulate non-coal mining activity that does
not contemplate an end use or a specific commodity. In other words, we regulate the
activity, not the specific commodities, unless otherwise exempted. Secondly, if you look
at the legislative findings at UCA 40-8-2, these findings recognize that mining is an
essential activity in an industrialized society—and Fm just paraphrasing right now-and
that in order to mine, surface disturbing activity is unavoidable. The legislative findings
also state that mined land should be reclaimed to promote post-mining land uses, and that
reclamation requirements need to reflect the diversity of topographic, geologic, economic
and other criteria specific to a given deposit. Therefore, I think that one can - - one can
reasonably conclude that reclamation of disturbances, not commodities-specific or enduse reclamation is directed by statute. The legislature exempted from regulation by Oil
Gas & Mining sand, gravel, and rock aggregate in conjunction with sand and gravel
operations, again, with no mention of end use." R. 362-363. The Division's definition of
sand and gravel "closely mirrors" that found in the American Geological Institute
glossary of geologic terms and the U.S. Bureau of Mines. R. 365-366.
In addition to the hearing, testimony, and exhibits, the Board also received and
carefully considered all written comments filed with the Board's Secretary up until the
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close of the comment period on March 18, 1998. In particular, the Board reviewed and
considered five sets of comments from representatives of the following:
1.

Salt Lake City Corporation (dated 3/15/1998; filed 3/17/1998) (supporting
the proposed rule);

2.

Jack B. Parsons Companies (dated 3/17/1998; filed 3/18/1998) (opposing
the proposed rule);

3.

Kenton P. Barker and Georgia L. Barker (dated 3/2/1998; filed 3/3/1998)
(supporting the proposed rule);

4.

Associated General Contractors (dated 3/10/1998; filed 3/12/1998)
(opposing the proposed rule); and

5.

Cindy Kromer (dated 3/18/1998; filed 3/18/1998) (supporting the proposed
rule).

In a letter received by the Division on March 3, 1998, concerned citizens Kenton
and Georgia Barker stated that "[w]e have been impacted by a nonconforming gravel
operation in our community, and the lack of clarity in the state regulations makes our jobs
much more difficult. The definition you have proposed appears to be fair and reasonable.
without placing an undue burden on any group.'* R. 335. On March 16, 1998, Craig A.
Hinckley, the Principal Planner for the Salt Lake City Planning Division offered his
support for the rock aggregate definition proposed by the Board. "We believe that the
proposed definitions are reasonable and are consistent with accepted National standards
within the Industry. We also believe that State regulations of bedrock mining would be
consistent with accepted public policies enacted and administered by other Western
States

We would welcome the State's participation and expertise in the process
14

If it is determined that the State has regulatory jurisdiction over a mining operation within
the boundaries of Salt Lake City, the State should take the lead, with participation by Salt
Lake City in the evaluation and approval process." R. 417-418.
The Division's recommendations to the Board stated ~[t]here are no comments
which have been received on these proposed rules which cause the Division to
recommend that the Board change its published proposed definitions for sand, gravel and
rock aggregate. Final adoption is recommended." R. 442. The Board considered all
supporting and opposing comments, sworn testimony, and exhibits received into the
Admin. R. in this rulemaking matter, and issued its final decision based on that record. R.
444.
The Board reviewed an April 6, 1998 memorandum to the Board from the
Division's Acting Director Lowell Braxton regarding "Analysis of Comments on the
Proposed Sand Gravel and Rock Aggregate Proposed Rules-Cause No. DAR 20727" (R.
428-442), which was prepared by the Division at the Board's request (hereinafter the
"Analysis Document"). R. 454.
Pursuant to Notice, on April 22, 1998, at the Department of Natural Resources
Building in Salt Lake City, Utah, a quorum of the Board convened to deliberate in the
rulemaking matter concerning the Rule, which the Board expressly treated as arising
under the Utah Mined Land Reclamation Act, Utah Code Ann. § 40-8-1 (1998) and the
Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-46a-l to 16 (Supp. 1990).
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Since the public comment period for the above matter closed March 18, 1998, no further
evidence or oral argument was heard at the April 22, 1998 deliberation hearing. R. 18,
452. The Board received and carefully reviewed comments from the public about the
proposed rule (i.e., an amendment to Utah Administrative Code R647-1-106) to define
the meaning of "sand," "graver' and "rock aggregate" for purposes of the Utah Minerals
Program. R. 19,453.
The Board's final written decision, which explains why the Board adopted the
Rule, is entitled, "Corrected Final Order to Adopt Rule"1 (5/11/1998) (the -Final Order").
In the Final Order, the Board expressly adopted and incorporated by reference the
Analysis Document as its own. R. 18-25, 452-459, 428-442. For the detailed reasons set
forth in the Analysis Document and for the additional reasons stated in the Final Order,
the Board found that the Rule is (a) amply supported by substantial evidence in the record
and (b) is entirely consistent with the intended legal scope of the Mining Act. R. 21, 455.
For the reasons set forth in the Analysis Document, the Board did not agree with the two
commenters (i.e., Jack B. Parsons Companies and Contractors) who urged the Board to
reject the "rock aggregate" portion of the then-proposed Rule. R. 21, 455.

*To correct an inadvertent typographical error in the definition of "rock aggregate" as
reprinted in the "Order to Adopt Rule" issued in this matter May 5,1998 and served May 7, 1998
(the "Initial Order") (Admin. R. Vol. II at 405), the Board issued the "Corrected Final Order to
Adopt Rule" (the "Corrected Final Order") (Admin. R. Vol. II at 414). The Corrected Final
Order superseded and replaced the Initial Order.
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The Board found that the definitions of "%sand, graveL and rock aggregate'' set forth
in the Rule are rationally based on substantial geological evidence and, as such, are
entirely consistent with the letter and intent of the Legislative exemption in the Act for
"sand, gravel and rock aggregate" deposits and operations. R. 21, 455. The Board stated:
"Since the Legislature chose to not define the meaning of 'sand, gravel and rock
aggregate' in the Act, the Board concludes that the Legislature expected and intended for
the Board to use the Board and the Division's special technical and administrative
expertise over mining and geological matters to adopt, by rule, rational scientific
definitions to implement the 'sand, gravel and rock aggregate' exemption." R. 21-22,
455-456. It further stated: "The Board does not agree with the opponents' apparent
contention that the definitions set forth above somehow improperly expand the Board and
the Division's jurisdiction over previously exempt operators. The Board finds that the
purpose and effect of the proposed rule is entirely consistent with the Legislature's intent.
Indeed, the Board views the new rule as fulfilling the Legislature's desire to exempt bona
fide 'sand, gravel and rock aggregate' operations, but not others. The Board has no
hidden agenda to expand its or the Division's regulatory jurisdictional mandate over nonexempt mining operations in Utah. Instead, the Board has an affirmative and solemn
obligation under the law to apply the Act to all persons covered by its requirements. The
Board and the Division apply the Act uniformly and fairly without discrimination,
partiality, favoritism or bias for or against any non-exempt operator. Thus, all non-

17

exempt mine operators within the scope of the Act must comply with its provisions. The
Board has a non-negotiable duty under law fully and fairly to regulate all non-exempt
operators. The Board finds that the new rule will help further this substantial
governmental objective. The Board and the Division simply do not have the option to
exempt from regulation any non-exempt mine operators covered by the Act." R. 22, 456.
The Board stated: 'The Board's definitions of "sand, gravel and rock aggregate'
rationally delimit the Board's and the Division's jurisdiction so as to insure, as the
Legislature intended, that bona fide 'sand, gravel and rock aggregate' operators are not
regulated by the Board or the Division. To the extent an operation is a "sand, gravel and
rock aggregate' operation (i.e., as those three key terms are defined in the new rule), that
operation will remain, as it always has been, exempt from the Act. While it is possible
that certain mining operations which are not exempt, and really never have been exempt,
may have been out of compliance with the Act, the scope of the Board's and the
Division's jurisdiction remains unchanged by the rule. Indeed, the Board hopes that the
helpful definitional clarification provided by the rule substantially will improve the rate
and level of voluntary compliance with the Act by all non-exempt operators in this State."
R. 23, 457.
On September 10, 1998, Contractors filed a Summons and a Complaint in District
Court against the Board starting the present lawsuit. R. 461-468.
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
This appeal brings before the Court, in the context of a rulemaking proceeding,
one of the two issues addressed to this Court in Larsen Limestone Co. v. State Division of
Oil Gas & Mining. 903 P.2d 429, 430 (Utah 1995). In that case, this Court did not reach
the specific issue of the Board of Oil, Gas and Mining's (BOGM) interpretation of the
statutory term "sand, gravel and rock aggregate'' as found at Utah Code Ann. § 40-8-4(3)
and (8) (1998). For a variety of reasons, including the requirement of the Utah
Administrative Rulemaking Act, rulemaking is required "when an agency issues a written
interpretation of a state or federal legal mandate." Utah Code Ann. § 63-46a-3 (1989).
The Board, therefore, exercising its express power to make rules as are reasonable and
necessary to carry out the purposes of Chapter 40-8-1, entered into rulemaking
proceedings for the purposes of defining the undefined terms "sand," "gravel" and "rock
aggregate." At the end of a year-long process and five public hearings, the Board adopted
definitions for these rules and reaffirmed its rationale and definition of rock aggregate
from its decision in Larson Limestone.
On judicial review, the appropriate standard of deference to the Board's
determination is an intermediate standard of reasonableness and rationality. Based on a
long line of cases, this Court has consistently granted deference to an administrative
agency when interpreting its organic statute for purposes of determining its own
jurisdiction where the Legislature has granted the agency explicit authority to do so and
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where the agency is as well situated as the reviewing Court to make the policy decision.
In support of the Board's rulemaking, this Court should determine that there is
substantial evidence on the record. The burden is upon the Appellant to demonstrate to
the Court by marshaling all of the evidence in support of an agency decision that,
nonetheless, the record as a whole does not support the agency's exercise of its discretion.
This marshaling burden has not been met or even attempted by the Appellant Contractors.
Instead, the Contractors' Brief relies upon its counsels' own view of policy, fails to cite to
the record, and argues that the sole fact in support of the agency's rulemaking is the
legislative history. The Board compiled a substantial agency Administrative Record in
support of its rulemaking which demonstrates that the substantial evidence in the Record
supports its action.
Finally, regarding Appellant's claim of improper denial of discovery in the trial
court below, the Board demonstrates that the Appellant has failed to cite to any fact or
cite any law in support of its request. The Board demonstrates that the Rulemaking Act
and general principles of due process do not provide for selective augmentation of the
Administrative Record on appeal and that the District Court properly denied discovery to
the Appellants.
LEGAL ARGUMENT
I. Rule 24
Contractors' brief fails to meet the requirements of Rule 24(a) of the Utah Rules of
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Appellate Procedure. The Utah Court of Appeals considered this rule in Steel v. Board of
Review of Indus. Common of Utah. 845 P.2d 960, 961-962 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). In
steel, the court wrote:
Pursuant to Rule 24(a)(7), an appellant's brief must contain a "statement of
the facts relevant to the issues presented for review," and ;;[a]ll statements
of fact and references to the proceedings below shall be supported by
citations to the record/' Likewise, subsection (a)(9) of Rule 24 requires the
argument in a brief to contain "citations to the . . . parts of the record relied
on" therein. Briefs that do not comply with Rule 24 "may be stricken, on
motion or sua sponte by the court, and the court may assess attorney fees
against the offending lawyer." Utah R. App. P. 24(k). If a party fails to
provide a statement of the facts along with a citation to the record where
those facts are supported, we will assume the correctness of the judgment
[below].
Id. at 961-962.
Contractors' "statement of facts" and entire brief are rife with unsubstantiated
assertions lacking any foundation at all, let alone foundation in the administrative record.
Within Contractors' "statement of facts," fact one is only a partial quote. Fact two,
may be accurate but is not a fact for purposes of this proceeding and facts five, eight and
nine are not cited in any manner. Appellant's Brief at 4-6.
Contractors' "Summary of The Argument" accuses the board of improper
procedures, is slanderous, and is not supported by citation to the administrative record
whatsoever. Without any citation Contractors assert that: "Reclamation needs and
requirements for a given mine are determined by how the area is left after the extraction
process is completed, not by how hard or soft or loose or solid is the material extracted.
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Sand and gravel operations, with or without bedrock clearly do not implicate the
problems with which the legislature was concerned when enacting the Act and
Exemption/* Appellant's Brief at 14.
Throughout section I, B, 3, of Contractors' Brief titled 'The Rule is unworkable
from a practical standpoint." Contractors makes de minimus citations to the record in
support of their assertions and treats all of these assertions as facts. Appellant's Brief at
15.
Contractors also writes: %tRather, BOGM relies solely upon the 'big rocks made
into little rocks* statement made by Representative Christensen for support of its
definition for "rock aggregate.' Appellant's Brief at 17, 20 (emphasis added). This
statement is false, misleading and totally fails to meet the marshaling requirement.
Contractors write: uYet the Rule regulates nearly even' such [sand and gravel]
operation despite the Legislature's clear intent to exclude just such operations.
Appellant's Brief at 22. Again Contractors merely asserts this statement without any
authority, let alone citation to the administrative record. Contractors also implores the
court, in footnote 6 on page 23 of his brief, to consider a letter which is not part of the
administrative record or properly proffered. Instead opposing counsel simply attached
this letter to a pleading.
Contractors accuses the DOGM and BOGM as follows:
Furthermore, at least DOGM, and possibly BOGM, had in their files certain
correspondence and analyses relating to the Rule and the Act which were
??

never included as part of the administrative record as provided to the lower
court. Given this disparity, it became imperative for AGCU to determine
what materials BOGM actually had before it and relied on, as well as to
what extent BOGM took into consideration materials in DOGM's files but
not otherwise appearing in the administrative record in reaching its
decision.

Appellant's Brief at 30. This accusation is not supported anywhere in the administrative
record.
Contractors' Brief also contains factual and legal mistakes extending beyond the
scope of the administrative record. For example, Appellant cites Ferro v. Dept. of
Commerce Div. of Occupational and Professional Licensing. 828 P.2d 507, 514 (Utah Ct.
App. 1992) as authority for rules of statutory construction. Appellant's Brief at 16.
While the canon of construction Contractors seek to invoke may be accurate, the Ferro
case is not. Slightly a year after the Ferro opinion was handed down, the Court of
Appeals reconsidered some of the issues adjudicated in Ferro in King v. Industrial
Common of Utah. 850 P.2d 1281 (Utah App. 1993). In King the court reflected on Judge
Bench's Ferro opinion and concluded:
Recently Judge Bench has articulated a slightly different view of the
appropriate analysis mandated by Morton... We turn now to Utah
Supreme Court cases to determine whether they have applied the analysis
articulated by Judge Bench or the broader one used in the earlier opinions
issued by this court... This illustration does not show a specific legislative
directive to define a statutory term by rules as Judge Bench would require.
850 P.2d at 1289-1290.
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Contractors also cites Ferro for the proposition that the term *wrock aggregate"
commonly refers to "sand and gravel processing operations/' Appellant's Brief at 19-20.
The Ferro case addresses the denial of a psychology license by the Division of
Occupational and Professional Licensing. Ferro does not speak to the definition of rock
aggregate.
Contractors also cites Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-14 (1998) as a repealed statute
having implications for the standard of review in this case. Section 54-7-14 (1998) does
not appear to have been repealed and is a statute governing public utilities. Its inclusion
on Contractors' Brief is further evidence of Contractors failure to comply with the
diligence requirements of Rule 24(a).
Despite Contractors' failure to comply with Rule 24(a), the State does not request
that Contractors' Brief be struck. Instead, the Court should assume that the facts found
below are supported by substantial evidence and that the trial court's discovery ruling was
proper based on Rule 24 deficiencies in Appellant's Brief. Steel at 963.
II. The Standard of Judicial Review
This proceeding is governed primarily by the Mining Act and the Rulemaking Act.
The section of the Rulemaking Act entitled " Judicial Challenge to Administrative Rules"
states in pertinent part:
(l)(a) Any person aggrieved by a rule may obtain judicial review of
the rule by filing a complaint with the county clerk in the district
court where the person resides or in the district court in Salt Lake
County.
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(4) The district court may grant relief to the petitioner by:
(a) declaring the rule invalid, if the court finds that:
(i) the rule violates constitutional or statutory law or the agency does not
have legal authority to make the rule;
(ii) the rule is not supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of
the whole administrative record; or
(iii) the agency did not follow proper rulemaking procedure;
(b) declaring the rule nonapplicable to the petitioner;
(c) remanding the matter to the agency for compliance with proper
rulemaking procedures or further fact-finding;
(d) ordering the agency to comply with Section 63-46a-3;
(e) issuing a judicial stay or injunction to enjoin the agency from illegal
action or action that would cause irreparable harm to the petitioner; or
(f) any combination of Subsections (a) through (e).
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46a-12.1 (Supp. 1990) (UARA).
The first issue before the Court is the proper standard of judicial review of
rulemaking by the Board which addresses the undefined statutory terms "sand," "gravel,'*
and %crock aggregate." The proper standard of review in this case is the intermediate
standard which asks whether the Board's jurisdictional definitions of sand, gravel, and
rock aggregate are within the tolerable limits of reason. The analysis of the Court in the
case of Williams v. Public Service Common. 754 P.2d 41 (Utah 1987) (Williams ID
although a pre-UARA case, is still appropriate. In that case, as in this case, the Court was
asked to determine the scope of an agency's authority to adopt regulations which would
have the practical effect of interpreting the scope of its own statutory authority. The
Court, which affirmed the P S C s rule, stated:
When reviewing the PSC's interpretation of general questions of law, this
Court applies a correction-of-error standard, granting no deference to PSC
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dec ision. Utah Dep't ot Admin. Serv. v. Public Serv. Comm'n. 658 P.2d
601, 608 (Utah 1983). This Court will afford great deference to PSC
findings on matters of basic fact upholding those findings based on any
evidence of substance. Id at 608-09. For matters of ultimate fact, mixed
findings of fact and law, and the PSC's interpretation of the operative
provisions of the statutory law it is empowered to administer, PSC findings
must be rationally based and are set aside only if they are imposed
arbitrarily or capriciously or are beyond the tolerable limits of reason. Id, at
609-12. The statutes governing the jurisdiction of the PSC fall within this
third, intermediate category. Thus, we will grant deference to the PSC's
determination of its own jurisdiction if that determination is within the
tolerable limits of reason. This view is in accord with this Court's statutory
authorization to review PSC decisions. Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-16 (1986);
see also Pan American World Airways. Inc. v. C.A.B.. 392 F.2d 483, 496
(D.C. Cir. 1968) (deference granted to administrative board's determination
of its own jurisdiction).
754 P.2d at 50 (emphasis added). Accord Morton Intl. Inc.. v. Auditing Div. of the Utah
State Tax Comirfn. 814 P.2d 581, 585-86 (Utah 1991) (UAPA decision; same statement
of standard of review). The Board, in the court below, relied on the above-quoted
analysis for the same proposition as later upheld in Morton Int'l v. Auditing Div. of the
Utah State Tax Comm'n. 814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991).
Contractors argue, in contrast, that the proper standard of review in a case
governed by UARA is the entirely non-deferential correction of error standard. While the
correction of error standard is applicable to general questions of law, the technical
definitions of "sand," "gravel," and "rock aggregate" as adopted by the Board for the very
specific purposes of the Mining Act are not "general questions of law/' Rather, as the
voluminous Administrative Record makes clear, the Board's definition of "sand,"
"gravel," and "rock aggregate" are the product of a thoughtful and reasonable
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consideration of technical questions of fact, law and regulatory policy in an area where
the Board has been granted explicit rulemaking authority and discretion. For the Board to
implement a blanket statutory exemption for sand, gravel, and rock aggregate, lines had to
be drawn, and the Board had a statutory obligation to implement the Act.
Although the Contractors belabor the fact that Williams II is a case decided before
the Rulemaking Act the Contractors offer the Court no cogent reasons why the judicial
standard of review under the Rulemaking Act should be different than it was under the
State's predecessor administrative rulemaking law. Nothing on the face of the
Rulemaking Act itself is hostile to the sensible notion that an intermediate standard of
review is warranted when, as here, an agency is undertaking to define technical terms
relevant to the agency's organic Act. This is particularly true where the agency has a
specific statutory obligation to make rules for that purpose.
The challenged technical definitions can be viewed as either mixed findings of fact
and law or, perhaps more properly, as the Board's exercise of both its explicit and
implicit powers to interpret under its rulemaking authority the operative provisions of the
statutory law it is empowered to administer. Under either analysis, Williams II provides
an appropriate standard of review for such administrative decisions in that this type of
Board finding must be rationally based. That is, the Court should set aside the rule only if
the rule is imposed arbitrarily or capriciously, or is beyond the tolerable limits of reason.
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Contractors' reliance upon Semeco Industries, Inc. v. Auditing Division of the
Utah State Tax Common. 849 P.2d 1167 (Utah 1993) is misplaced. See Appellant's Brief
at 27-29. In the first instance. Semeco is not antagonistic to the Board's position. The
portions of Semeco quoted by Contractors are from the dissenting opinion of Justice
Durham. Justice Durham did not disavow the intermediate standard of review for
reasonableness and rationality when a court is asked to consider challenges under UAPA
where the court is reviewing an agency's factual findings under a "substantial evidence
test." Justice Durham also reaffirmed that the intermediate standard of review applies to
UAPA cases where there is a claim that the agency has abused its explicit or implicit
exercise of statutorily delegated discretion.
Moreover, the dissent was not purporting to address the UARA in Semeco. The
administrative functions and purposes of adjudications involving the rights of individual
parties and general rulemaking proceedings obviously have fundamental differences.
Thus, this Court has required and UARA itself requires rulemaking for a variety of
different reasons.
Most importantly, however, is the syntheses and agreement among Justice
Durham's analysis in Semeco. this Court's opinion in Bennion v. ANR Production Co.,
819 P.2d 343 (Utah 1991), Morton IntT Inc. v. Auditing Division. 814 P.2d 581, and
Williams II. None of these opinions are inhospitable to the application of the
intermediate standard of review to this rulemaking case.
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In Bennion. the Court's analysis relied on the correction of error standard for
review of a question of general law under sub-section (4)(b) of UAPA (acts beyond
jurisdiction). The court applied the correction of error standard because ~the particular
statutory terms [did] not expressly grant the Board discretion." Bennion, 819 P.2d at 349.
In Bennion. the Board was exercising its jurisdiction to adjudicate under Utah Code Ann.
§ 40-6-1 (1998) generally, and specifically under section 40-6-6(5) (forced pooling). Not
only was the Board not engaged in rulemaking, the grant of rulemaking authority under
section 40-6-5 is expressly limited to certain enumerated provisions. However, the Court
also upheld the Board's exercise of an inherent power to clarify its jurisdictional
boundaries in the context of both Morton Int'l and specifically acknowledged that the
Board of Oil, Gas and Mining has i%in addition to those powers expressly conferred upon
an administrative agency, the agency has such implied powers as are reasonably
necessary to effectuate its express powers or duties." Bennion, 819 P.2d at 350 (citing
Williams v. Public Service Comm'n, 754 P.2d 4, 50 (Utah 1988) (powers umust be
expressly granted or clearly implied as necessary to the discharge of the duties and
responsibilities imposed upon it.")).
In Semeco Justice Durham reaffirmed Morton's explication %4that some agency
interpretations or applications of law might require review under sub-section (4)(h)(i),
which permits appellate relief for ; an abuse of discretion delegated to the agency by
statute.' See id. at 588-89." 849 P.2d at 1172. Therefore, where the interpretation is an
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exercise of statutorily delegated discretion, the intermediate reasonableness standard is
appropriate. Justice Durham's analysis closes the loop in this line of cases by pointing
out that in Morton (as well as in Williams II), a statutory delegation of discretion can
occur both explicitly and implicitly. Thus, UAPA does not alter pre-UAPA standards of
review concerning claims of abuse of discretion, as Justice Durham explains Morton in
her Semeco dissent:
In the absence of discernible legislative intent concerning this specific
question and issue, a choice among permissible interpretations of the statute
is largely a policy determination. The agency that has been granted
authority to administer the statute is the appropriate body to make such a
determination. Indeed, both the legislative history to Section 63-46b-16,
and our prior cases suggest that an appellate court should not substitute its
judgment for the agency's judgment concerning the wisdom of the agency's
policy. When there is no discernible legislative intent concerning the
specific issue the legislature has, in effect, left the issue unresolved. In such
a case it is appropriate to conclude that the legislature has delegated
authority to decide the issue.
Semeco, 849 P.2d at 1173 (Durham, J., dissenting). Justice Durham cautions that both
courts and attorneys distinguish between whether an agency action is an interpretation or
application of law reviewed under sub-section (4)(d), or "merely an exercise of implicitly
delegated discretion to interpret or apply the law, reviewed under sub-section (4)(h)(i))."
Id. 1174.
III. The Board has the Power to Promulgate the Rule
The Mining Act vests substantial technical and policy discretion in the Board over
mining matters in the state. The Mining Act section entitled "Board - Powers, Functions,
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and Duties/' states in pertinent part:
In addition to those provided in Title 40, Chapter 6. the Board has the
following powers, functions, and duties:
(1) to enact rules according to the procedures and
requirements of Title 63, Chapter 46(a). that are reasonably
necessary to carry out the purposes of this chapter.
(2) to hold hearings and issue orders or other appropriate
instruments based upon the results of those hearings.
(3) to issue emergency orders according to the requirements
and provisions of Title 63, Chapter 46b.
(4) to do all other things and take such other actions within
the purposes of this Act as may be necessary to enforce its
provisions.
Utah Code Ann. § 40-8-6 (1998) (emphasis added).
The Legislature has created the Board as "the policy making body for the Division
of Oil, Gas & Mining." Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-4(1) (1998) (emphasis added). By law,
the Board has substantial special expertise concerning mining, oil and gas, geological,
mineral royalty, ecological and environmental matters, as follows:
(2) The Board shall consist of seven members appointed by the governor,
with the advice and consent of the senate. No more than four members
shall be from the same political party. The members shall have the
following qualifications:
(a) two members knowledgeable in mining matters;
(b) two members knowledgeable in oil and gas matters;
(c) one member knowledgeable in ecological and environmental matters;
(d) one member who is a private land owner, owns a mineral or royalty
interest and is knowledgeable in those interests; and
(e) one member who is knowledgeable in geological matters.
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Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-4(2) (1998). : Pursuant to Utah Code Section 40-8-5(1 )(a), 'The
board and the division have jurisdiction and authority over all persons and property, both
public and private, necessary to enforce" the Mining Act. The Mining Act expressly
gives the Board the power "to enact rules according to the procedures and requirements of
Title 63, Chapter 46a, that are reasonably necessary to carry out the purposes o f the
Mining Act. Id at § 40-8-6(1) (emphasis added).
The full text of the administrative Rule adopted by the Board and now challenged
by the Contractors states:.
''Sand" means a naturally occurring unconsolidated to moderately
consolidated accumulation of rock and mineral particles, the dominant size
range being between 1/16mm to 2mm, which has been deposited by
sedimentary processes.
"GraveF means a naturally occurring unconsolidated to moderately
consolidated accumulation of rock and mineral particles, the dominant size range
being between 2mm and 10mm, which has been deposited by sedimentary
processes.
"Rock Aggregate*' means those consolidated rock materials associated with
a sand deposit, a gravel deposit, or a sand and gravel deposit, that were created b\
alluvial sedimentary processes. The definition of rock aggregate specifically
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The director of the Division is also subject to competency requirements imposed
by law, as follows: "The director of the Division of Oil, Gas and Mining shall be
appointed by the director of the Department of Natural Resources with the concurrence of
the Board of Oil, Gas and Mining. The director shall be the executive and administrative
head of the Division of Oil, Gas and Mining and shall be a person experienced in
administration and knowledgeable in the extraction of oil gas and minerals.'* Utah Code
Ann. §40-6-15(1998).
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excludes any solid rock in the form of bedrock which is exposed at the
surface of the earth or overlain by unconsolidated material.
Utah Admin. Code R647-1-106.
It is useful to understand the regulatory context in which the Board adopted the
challenged Rule. The Board's and the Division's regulatory requirements for hard-rock
mining operations are in the Mining Act and the rules in the Utah Admin. Code at R647
(the Minerals Program). The Board agrees with the Contractors that the Mining Act is
not applicable to 'wsand, gravel and rock aggregate" deposits or operations. This point of
law is undisputed because the Legislature has expressly said so in the Mining Act, both in
the definition of "deposit"3 and in the definition of "mining operation."4 The sole issue is
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The Mining Act, at Section 40-8-4(3), states:
"'(a) Deposit" or 'mineral deposit* means an accumulation of mineral matter in the form
of consolidated rock, unconsolidated material, solutions, or otherwise occurring on the
surface, beneath the surface, or in the waters of the land from which any produce useful to
man may be produced, extracted, or obtained or which is extracted by underground
mining methods for underground storage.
(b) 'Deposit' or 'mineral deposit' excludes sand, gravel, rock aggregate, water,
geothermal steam, and oil and gas as defined in Title 40, Chapter 6, but includes oil shale
and bituminous sands extracted by mining operations."
4

The Mining Act, at Section 40-8-(8), states:
(a) 'Mining operation* means those activities conducted on the surface of the land for the
exploration for, development of, or extraction of a mineral deposit, including, but not
limited to, surface mining and the surface effects of underground and in situ mining, onsite transportation, concentrating, milling, evaporation, and other primary processing,
(b) 'Mining operation* does not include: the extraction of sand, gravel, and rock
aggregate; the extraction of oil and gas as defined in Title 40, Chapter 6; the extraction of
geothermal steam; smelting or refining operations; off-site operations and transportation;
or reconnaissance activities and activities which will not cause significant surface
resource disturbance or involve the use of mechanized earth-moving equipment such as
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whether the Board's new Rule defining the meaning of sand, gravel and rock aggregate
for purposes of enforcing the Minerals Program is lawful. All deposits or operations
which fall within the Board's definitions of sand, gravel and rock aggregate are exempt
from the requirements of the Mineral Program, but the Contractors want a broader
exemption than that adopted by the Board. The Board found that the rational, scientific
geologic factors test suggested by the Division and other members of the public best
fulfilled the Legislative desire to exempt genuine sand, gravel and rock aggregate
deposits and operations from the requirements of the Mining Act, but no others. The
Board concluded that the end product use or in-situ intrinsic value tests favored at
different times by the Contractors impermissibly would create a broader and unwieldy
exemption.
The Board adopted the Rule because the Legislature did not, within the four
corners of the Mining Act, define these three key terms. Since the Legislature has
exempted A, B and C, the Board, the Division, the industry and the public at large need a
shared definition of A, B and C. When an administrative agency is charged with
responsibility to enforce a regulatory law, and when that agency is given the power under
law to adopt administrative rules as "reasonably.necessary" to get the job done, it is well
within an agency's prerogative to adopt an administrative rule to implement important
undefined terms in the regulatory statute.

bulldozers or backhoes."
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Contractors allege that the Board's definition of sand, gravel and rock aggregate
improperly conflicts with defined terms in the Mining Act for "mining operations" and
"mineral deposits." See Appellant's Brief at 10-11. The fallacy in Contractors' "contrary
to law" argument is that the very sections of the Mining Act which define "mining
operations" and "mineral deposits" expressly exclude sand, gravel and rock aggregate
from their scope. The Mining Act, at Section 40-8-4(3), states:
""(a) Deposit' or 'mineral deposit' means an accumulation of mineral
matter in the form of consolidated rock, unconsolidated material, solutions,
or otherwise occurring on the surface, beneath the surface, or in the waters
of the land from which any product useful to man may be produced,
extracted, or obtained or which is extracted by underground mining
methods for underground storage.
(b) 'Deposit' or 'mineral deposit' excludes sand, gravel, rock aggregate,
water, geothermal steam, and oil and gas as defined in Title 40, Chapter 6,
but includes oil shale and bituminous sands extracted by mining
operations."
Id. Likewise, the Mining Act, at Section 40-8-(8), states:
"(a) "Mining operation' means those activities conducted on the surface of
the land for the exploration for, development of, or extraction of a mineral
deposit, including, but not limited to, surface mining and the surface effects
of underground and in situ mining, on-site transportation, concentrating,
milling, evaporation, and other primary processing,
(b) 'Mining operation' does not include: the extraction of sand, gravel, and
rock aggregate; the extraction of oil and gas as defined in Title 40, Chapter
6; the extraction of geothermal steam, smelting or refining operations; offsite operations and transportation; or reconnaissance activities and activities
which will not cause significant surface resource disturbance
or involve the use of mechanized earth-moving equipment
such as bulldozers or backhoes."
Id. Having persuaded the Legislature to exclude "sand, gravel and rock aggregate" from
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the definitions of "deposit/' "mineral deposif' and "mining operation/' the Contractors
cannot now argue that the definitions of sand, gravel and rock aggregate must be based
upon the very terms which exclude them. For the Board to give effect to the intent of the
Legislature, the Board needed to define sand, gravel and rock aggregate based on
substantial evidence in the record, and it did so.
IV. The Rule is Reasonable and Based Upon Substantial Evidence
In applying the intermediate standard of review to the facts of this case, the
Board's Rule must be supported by substantial evidence in the administrative record as a
whole, as follows:
Substantial evidence "is the quantum and quality of relevant evidence that
is adequate to convince a reasonable mind to support a conclusion." First
Nat* 1 Bank v. County Bd. of Equalization, 799 P.2d ! 163, 1165 (Utah
1990); accord Semeco Indus, v. State Tax Common, 849 P.2d 1167, 1173
(Utah 1993) (Durham, J., dissenting). Thus, under the substantial evidence
test, this court must determine if the findings of fact were reasonable and
rational. Id.; see also Grace Drilling v. Board of Review, 110 Utah Adv.
Rep. 34, 776 P.2d 63, 68 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (finding that substantial
evidence is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion"). However, examining the Board's
findings of fact does not constitute a de novo review or a reweighing of the
evidence. Ouestar Pipeline Co. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 850 P.2d 1175,
1178 (Utah 1993)
Larson Limestone Co. v. Division of Oil Gas & Mining, 903 P.2d 429 (Utah 1995).
In applying the intermediate standard of review to the facts of this case, the court
should find that the Board's definition is supported by substantial evidence for three main
reasons. First, the Board's definition does not improperly expand the Board and the
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Division's jurisdiction. The Board stated: 'The Board's definitions of'sand, gravel and
rock aggregate' rationally delimit the Board's and the Division's jurisdiction so as to
insure, as the Legislature intended, that bona fide "sand, gravel and rock aggregate'
operators are not regulated by the Board or the Division." R. 457.
Second the Board's geologically based definition corresponds with the overall
purpose of the Mining Act. The Division's then-Acting Director Lowell Braxton
testified:
We have a statutory obligation to regulate non-coal mining activity that
does not contemplate an end use or a specific commodity. In other words,
we regulate the activity, not the specific commodities, unless otherwise
exempted. Secondly, if you look at the legislative findings at UCA 40-8-2.
these findings recognize that mining is an essential activity in an
industrialized society - - and I'm just paraphrasing right now - - and that in
order to mine, surface disturbing activity is unavoidable. The legislative
findings also state that mined land should be reclaimed to promote postmining land uses and that reclamation requirements need to reflect the
diversity of topographic, geologic, economic and other criteria specific to a
given deposit. Therefore, I think that one can - - one can reasonably
conclude that reclamation of disturbances, not commodities-specific or enduse reclamation is directed by statute. The legislature exempted from
regulation by Oil, Gas & Mining sand, gravel, and rock aggregate in
conjunction with sand and gravel operations, again, with no mention of end
use. R. 362-363.
Finally, the Board's definition is expressly based on the definition adopted by the
Board in Larsen and the holding by the Utah Supreme Court in Larson. R. 141-142.
Although the Supreme Court did not reach the ultimate question of the "rock aggregate"
definition adopted by adjudication in Larson, the court did agree with the Board that a
definition based on economic factors would not work:
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Larson's argument that it is a rock aggregate company rather than a
limestone company because a commercial market exists for its overburden
would mean that virtually any "mining operation" could avoid regulation
simply by selling its overburden. . . . Under Larson's theory, the operators
of a gold mine could remove gold from the limited mining areas, sell their
waste rock as rock aggregate, and avoid posting the $450,000 reclamation
surety, regardless of the actual size of the area disturbed by the total mining
effort. Clearly, the Utah legislature did not intend to permit circumvention
of the Act in this fashion.
Id. at 432. The Board's reasonable use of a geological factors test is supported by the
record. The Board fully considered the Analysis Document which discusses in "in some
detail the various options, including the pros and cons of each." R. 428-441. The Board
made a rational policy choice well within the tolerable limits of reason.
Although the burden is upon the Contractors to marshal the evidence first in
support of the Board's rule, and then to demonstrate that evidence which does not support
the Board's rule, the Contractors have failed to meet or even address this burden. Instead
the Contractors' Brief can best be summarized by a quote from the Contractors'
Memorandum in Support of their Motion for Summary' Judgment that "Representative
Christensen created the exemption as explained to him by the Sand and Gravel Industry
and it passed and became a law." R. 606. As stated in the Board's Reply Memorandum in
the court below "this novel one-man approach to legislative history clearly has its limits."
R. 624. The Contractors' reliance upon its lobbyists' assertions concerning his personal
intent is not helpful in discerning legislative intent. In this case, the text of the statute
simply does not define sand, gravel or rock aggregate - whether by the intrinsic value test
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favored by Contractors, or in any other way. If the law is not ambiguous there is no need
to resort to extrinsic help from legislative history. In this case, to the extent the legislative
history has any value, the only legislative history- Representative Christensen's on-therecord remarks to his fellow legislators. . . is entirely consistent with the Board's rule.
At best the Contractors' argument (in place of the marshaling requirement) stands
for the proposition that in the absence of a discernible legislative intent a choice among
possible interpretations of Representative Christensen's remarks is largely a policy
determination. Of course, if the rule is consistent with the legislative history for the
exemption it is not an abuse of discretion by the Board to make a rule consonant with it.
While introducing HB 311, the sponsor, Representative Jim Christensen, described rock
aggregate as, *'[s]ometimes when you deal with sand and gravel, house members you get
some big rocks in there and you kinda make small ones out of them. This is the aggregate
part of it." R. 51-52.
Representative Christensen did not say that traditional hardrock mining and
blasting of solid bedrock beneath layers of sand, gravel and large rocks mixed in with the
sand and/or gravel would qualify for the exemption, therefore, the rule rationally excludes
bedrock mining from rock aggregate exemption. Thus, in keeping with the Legislature's
choice of terms, the rock aggregate part of the rule draws a rational distinction between
boulders found within layers of sand or gravel on one hand, and bedrock on the other, and
is thus consistent with the legislative history. The parties and the Record, of course, are
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in agreement that the term rock aggregate in and of itself has no accepted geological
meaning. However, given the Legislature's choice of terms, the legislative history and
the practical problem of giving effect to the legislative language, the agency's choice
among permissible interpretations of the statute is largely a policy determination. Thus,
"[t]he agency that has been granted authority to administer a statute is the appropriate
body to make such a determination." Morton Int'l. Inc.. 814 P.2d at 589.
Finally, the Contractors' irrelevantly rely upon State Land Board v. State Dept. of
Fish and Game. 17 Utah 2d 237, 408 P.2d 707. 708 n.3 (Utah 1965), which incorporates
the definition of mineral as "any form of earth, rock or metal of greater values in the
enclosing country of the superficial soil.'' The State Land Board case is one of many that
have addressed the issue of what is encompassed within the term "minerals'' when used as
a reservation clause or granting clause in a deed. Its application to a
reclamation/environmental statute is dubious at best. As the Contractors have argued,
context is important. For example, in Watt v. Western Nuclear. Inc.. 462 U.S. at 36, 103
S. Ct. 2218 (1983), the U.S. Supreme Court expressly held that "gravel is 'mineral'
reserved to the United States in lands patented under the Stock-Raising Homestead Act.''
Watt, of course, is no more pertinent to the issues in this administrative rulemaking case
under the Mining Act than State Land Board, a case which reaches the opposite result in a
different context.
V. The Lower Court Appropriately Exercised its Discretion in Denying Discovery
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Despite their scurrilous attack on the credibility of both the Division of Oil, Gas &
Mining and "possibly BOGM," the Contractors provide no basis in fact for their
allegation that "certain correspondence and analysis relating to the rule under the Act"
were never included as part of the Administrative Record. The Contractors never alleged
this in the court below, and the Contractors have before this Court made no effort to
demonstrate what documents were removed from the Administrative Record. A review
of the substantial Administrative Record in this case, R. 27-477, demonstrates ample
opportunity for the Contractors to have supplemented, augmented and filed in the
Administrative Record any document they cared to insert. Given the 90-day extension of
time granted to the Contractors to extend the rulemaking process, the allegation of "less
than open and transparent nature of the rulemaking process*" is particularly egregious. R.
265-270.
The Contractors make no argument based upon any provision of the Utah
Administrative Record Act, nor do they cite a single authority for the proposition that
discovery is appropriate in a record review case. Instead, the Contractors simply seek a
remedy which would have the Court ignore the substantial due process protections of all
members of the public who are not party to this rules challenge. For example, Utah Code
Ann. §§ 63-46a-4 and -5, part of UARA, address the requirements of rulemaking
procedure and public hearings in rulemaking matters.
The Contractors, as with all members of the public, have always had the
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opportunity and indeed have taken advantage of the opportunity to submit written
comments to the Board. R. 412-416. The transcripts of all of these Board Hearings and
those documents filed by all parties, including the Board's staff the Division of Oil, Gas
and Mining, are within the Administrative Record. In short, the Contractors' have not
only failed to marshal the evidence, they seek the opportunity to create new evidence. It
is the burden of the Contractors to demonstrate, based upon the Administrative Record as
a whole, that it is not sufficient to constitute substantial evidence. Unsupported
allegations concerning the Board of Oil, Gas and Mining do not provide a basis in law or
a basis in fact for the requested discovery.
Finally, Contractors' assertion that they should be entitled to take the deposition of
Representative Christensen completely misses the point. Representative Christensen did
not pass the legislation, the entire legislature passed the legislation. If the Contractors'
logic were to be accepted, it would be necessary that each representative who listened to
and voted in response to Representative Christensen's amendment be provided an
opportunity to be deposed and state their understanding of Representative Christensen's
amendment. This endless process, the Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act and logic do
not contemplate.
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CONCLUSION
The Court should affirm the District Court's order upholding the challenged rule
and denying discovery.
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ADDENDUM

16
The 1997 (1st S S ) amendment, effective May 1, 1997, deleted "during its annual general session"
from the end of Subsection (2)(a) and in Subsection (5)(d) inserted "or is found to have a technical legal
defect preventing reauthorization of administrative rules intended to be reauthorized by the Legislature"
and substituted "June 15" for "April 15 "
The 1998 amendment, effective July 1, 1998, in Subsection (2) substituted "February 28" for "January
1" and made two minor stylistic changes, deleted "prior to January 1 of each year" before "Administrative"
at the beginning of Subsection (3)(a), added Subsection (3)(d), and made one minor stylistic change in
(5)(d)
Compiler's Notes. - Laws 1997 (1st S S ), ch 2, § 2 provides "(1) Article VI, Section I, of the Utah
Constitution grants the power to legislate to the Utah Legislature Because, in some cases, the Legislature
does not completely address the details of each legislative enactment it passes, it delegates a portion of
its lawmaking power to state agencies by granting them the power to enact administrative rules The
Legislature, by enacting Section 63-46a-11 5, reserved to itself some power over rules by providing that
all rules of the state expire unless reauthorized by the Legislature (2) The Legislature further recognizes
that the reauthorization of most state administrative rules each year is necessary to allow state
government to continue without disruption (3) Due to a technical oversight during the 1997 Annual
General Session, the Legislature, despite its expressed intent to do so, failed to reauthorize administrative
rules before their statutory expiration date The purpose of this act is to correct that oversight by
retrospectively reauthorizing state administrative rules so that administrative rules ^ r e properly
reauthorized in accordance with Section 63-46a-11 5 and continue in force with uninterrupted authority "

63-46a-12. Interested parties.
(1) An interested person may petition an agenc\ requesting the making, amendment, or
repeal of a rule
(2) The division shall prescribe by rule the form for petitions and the procedure for their
submission, consideration, and disposition.
(3) A statement shall accompany the proposed rule, or amendment or repeal of a rule,
demonstrating that the proposed action is within the jurisdiction of the agency and appropriate to
the powers of the agency.
(4) Within 30 days after submission of a petition, the agency shall either deny the petition in
a writing stating its reasons for the denial, or initiate rulemaking proceedings in accordance with
Section 63-46a-4.
History: C. 1953, 63-46a-12, enacted by L. 1985, ch. 158, § 1; 1987, ch. 241, § 13.
Administrative Rules. - This section is implemented by, interpreted by, or cited as authority
for the following administrative rule(s): R15-2, R728-101.
63-46a-12.1. Judicial challenge to administrative rules.
(1) (a) Any person aggrieved by a rule may obtain judicial review of the rule by filing a
complaint with the county clerk in the district court where the person resides or in the district
court in Salt Lake County.
(b) Any person aggrieved by an agency's failure to comply with Section 63-46a-3 may obtain
judicial review of the agency's failure to comply by filing a complaint with the clerk of the
district court where the person resides or in the district court in Salt Lake County.
(2) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (b), a person seeking judicial review under this
section shall exhaust his administrative remedies by complying with the requirements of Section
63-46a-12 before filing the complaint.
(b) When seeking judicial review of a rule, the person need not exhaust his administrative
remedies if:
(i) less than six months has passed since the date that the rule became effective and the
© 1999 Matthew Bender & Company, Inc All rights reserved
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person had submitted verbal or written comments on the rule to the agency during the public
comment period;
(ii) a statute granting rulemaking authority expressly exempts rules made under authority of
that statute from compliance with Section 63-46a-12; or
(iii) compliance with Section 63-46a-12 would cause the person irreparable harm.
(3) (a) Besides the information required by the Utah Rules of Ci\il Procedure, a complaint
filed under this section shall contain:
(i) the name and mailing address of the plaintiff:
(ii) the name and mailing address of the defendant agenc>;
(iii) the name and mailing address of any other party joined in the action as a defendant;
(iv) a copy of the rule or proposed rule, if any;
(v) an allegation that he has either exhausted the administrative remedies by complying with
Section 63-46a-12 or met the requirements for waiver of exhaustion of administrative remedies
established by Subsection (2)(b);
(vi) the relief sought; and
(vii) factual and legal allegations supporting the relief sought.
(b) (i) The plaintiff shall serve a summons and a copy of the complaint as required by the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
*
(ii) The defendants shall file a responsive pleading as required by the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedures.
(iii) The agency shall file the administrative record of the rule, if an\. with its responsive
pleading.
(4) The district court may grant relief to the petitioner b>:
(a) declaring the rule invalid, if the court finds that:
(i) the rule violates constitutional or statutory law or the agency does not have legal authority
to make the rule;
(ii) the rule is not supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole
administrative record; or
(iii) the agency did not follow proper rulemaking procedure;
(b) declaring the rule nonapplicable to the petitioner;
(c) remanding the matter to the agency for compliance with proper rulemaking procedures or
further fact-finding;
(d) ordering the agency to comply with Section 63-46a-3;
(e) issuing a judicial stay or injunction to enjoin the agency from illegal action or action that
would cause irreparable harm to the petitioner; or
(f) any combination of Subsections (a) through (e).
(5) If the plaintiff meets the requirements of Subsection (2)(b) the district court may review
and act on a complaint under this section whether or not the plaintiff has requested the agency
review under Section 63-46a-12.
History: C. 1953, 63-46a-12.1, enacted by L. 1990, ch. 224, § 2.
NOTES TO DECISIONS

Analysis
Public Service Commission.
Tax commission.
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